In 2015, the government of Uzbekistan not only failed to comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act minimum standards of prohibiting, punishing, deterring and taking serious efforts to eliminate trafficking in persons but continued to implement state policy of forced labor. The only appropriate ranking for Uzbekistan in the 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report is Tier 3. The Tier 3 ranking would communicate to the Uzbek government that its policy and practice of forced labor is unacceptable and encourage the Uzbek government to implement the raft of commitments it has made to apply international conventions prohibiting forced labor.

Citizens of Uzbekistan have documented, and the International Labour Organization (ILO) monitoring reported evidence the Uzbek government used forced labor by compelling more than one million citizens to work in cotton production. The government used coercion to oblige farmers to fulfill production quotas and other citizens to fulfill harvest quotas under threat of penalty. It also took extraordinary measures to cover up its use of coercion, including by arresting, attacking, and intimidating citizens who documented forced labor.

II. The government of Uzbekistan continued to organize, orchestrate and benefit from forced labor on a massive scale in 2015.¹

While many governments fail to comply with the TVPA minimum standards, the Uzbek government systematically orchestrates forced labor of more than one million of its citizens for the purpose of economic development that benefits the elite. In 2015 the government’s forced labor system of cotton production remained intact.

A. In 2015, the government of Uzbekistan used coercion to mobilize farmers to cultivate cotton for the centralized system of production; those who failed to comply were penalized.

The Uzbek government’s state-order system of cotton production remains underpinned by forced labor. Officials set the annual procurement price for cotton below the government’s estimate of production costs, and under their lease contracts, farmers were obliged to sell their cotton to the state-controlled enterprise Uzpahtasanoateksport.² This means that farmers cannot afford to hire voluntary labor for field work, including cotton harvesting, and cannot invest in equipment or improved production practices.
In 2015 the Uzbek government imposed annual production quotas on farmers and used coercion to enforce them. Officials threatened farmers with the loss of land, destroyed crops and used verbal and physical abuse at regular meetings known as the “cotton headquarters.”

On July 2, 2015, the 29-year-old farmer Nodirbek Khaydarov hanged himself in a cotton field after the Paytug city mayor and public prosecutor threatened to imprison him for failing to fulfill his assigned wheat production quota and cursed him at a cotton headquarters meeting. On July 7 in Tashkent region, the police beat and arrested Azizbek Astrakulov, arrested Shukhrat Astrakulov, and confiscated the wheat from both farmers’ land while they were detained. During the last week of July, the Shahrisabz district head of government and prosecutor destroyed farmers’ corn crops and claimed the farmers should have planted cotton on the land used for corn. On October 12, Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev ordered the penalization of farmers that had not fulfilled their state-assigned cotton production quotas, including by confiscating property and imprisonment. On October 30, police seized sheep and cows from Ulugbek Botirov, a farmer in the Yakhabog district of Kashkadarya region, following orders from the district prosecutor to penalize farmers who had not fulfilled state-assigned cotton production quotas.

B. In 2015, the government of Uzbekistan used coercion to mobilize adults and children to harvest cotton; those who failed to comply with orders were penalized.

1. The Uzbek government remained complicit in limited instances of forced child labor for cotton production in 2015.

In 2015, the Uzbek government sustained the policy it adopted in 2014 of no longer using forced child labor in the annual cotton harvest. This policy resulted in more than a million children removed from forced labor in 2014 and demonstrated the Uzbek government’s ability to unilaterally end state-orchestrated forced and child labor in the cotton sector. Unfortunately the government has not changed policies that ensured the continued, albeit much reduced, use of child labor in the cotton fields.

In 2015, the central government continued to order local officials to fulfill their portion of the national cotton production plan under threat of punishment, including dismissal. In some cases, this led local authorities to mobilize child labor rather than risk failing to meet their quotas. The government again mobilized third-year high-school students under threat of dismissal from school without exempting students under 18, the legal age for cotton work. Finally, the government forced adults to fulfill state-assigned work quotas in the cotton fields, resulting in children helping their parents fulfill their quotas and escape punishment.
In September, officials forced tens of thousands of students, including teenagers under age 18, to pick cotton in the Khorezm region each weekend. In the Kuyichirchik district of Tashkent region, children picked cotton in September, and reported doing so in order to help their parents fulfill assigned cotton picking quotas. In October, forced mobilization of students resulted in the death of a 17-year old boy, when an open-top cargo truck overturned while transporting him and others to farm No. 8 in the Mirzaobod district of Syrdarya region. Following orders from the regional governor, high schools in Pakhtakor, Dustlik, Mirzachul, Arnasay, Zafarobod, Zarbdar and Zaamin districts of Jizzak region forcibly mobilized second- and third-year students to pick cotton, and some high schools in the region closed and sent all the students to the harvest. Uzbek students begin the three-year high school typically at age 16, some at age 15.

2. The government of Uzbekistan systematically forced adults to weed cotton fields and pick cotton across the country and on a mass scale in 2015.

The Uzbek government forced adults throughout the country to fulfill fieldwork quotas during the springtime cotton field preparation season and the autumn cotton harvest. Officials used coercion to enforce the quotas.

Administrators of public universities and high schools forced students to weed cotton fields and harvest cotton under threat of expulsion. Administrators of education, healthcare, and other public institutions forced employees to pick cotton under threat of job loss or fines. Managers of joint-venture companies forced employees to pick cotton under threat of job loss. Mahallas carried out officials’ orders and forced welfare recipients to pick cotton under threat of cutting payments. Government officials extorted businesses for contributions to the harvest, threatened to cut off electricity and conduct extraordinary tax investigations. Officials closed some businesses for the duration of the harvest in order to free employees to pick cotton.

Government efforts to mobilize adults to pick cotton reached extraordinary levels. Administrators of a partially state-owned film company that manages personnel for the film industry in Uzbekistan threatened to blacklist actors if they did not participate in the cotton harvest. In the Alat district of Bukhara region, police forced women to pick cotton under threat of filing prostitution charges.

The official wage rate for cotton picking in 2015 was approximately $0.04 per kilogram, and harvest quotas averaged 50 kilograms per day. Most citizens wound up spending what little they earned ($2 / day or less) on food, housing and transportation necessary to fulfill their assigned work quotas.

3. Government officials extorted money from individuals and businesses on a mass scale in 2015.
The continuation of the forced-labor system of cotton production enabled officials to extort money from citizens throughout the country in 2015.

Officials sold exemptions from field work to citizens. The exemption fees ranged from $90 up to $400. Additionally, officials’ threats of penalties for failing to fulfill work quotas led citizens with adequate financial resources to hire people to work in their place. The average rate for substitute cotton pickers was $7 per day. Notably, an average monthly salary for a nurse is $80. As the father of an 18-year old student lamented, “It is not easy for us to find that kind of money. Where can I get so much money? There is no work, no salary.”

Officials also extorted payments from business owners who could not provide labor. For example, in Tashkent, officials from the city hall and tax authorities charged shop owners approximately $84 if they did not provide a worker to pick cotton for ten days.

Forced payments from businesses, payments to replacement workers, and payments to compensate for unmet quotas made under the threat of penalty, amounted to a massive, unregulated, and unaccounted for direct subsidy to the government’s forced labor-based cotton production system and/or corrupt officials, masking the true cost of cotton production in Uzbekistan.

4. The state forced-labor system resulted in deaths and undermined health care and education services and businesses.

In 2015, the Uzbek government’s use of forced labor resulted in at least nine deaths. In July, after officials in the Izbaskan district of Andijan region threatened him with imprisonment for failing to fulfill production quotas, 29-year old farmer Nodirbek Khaydarov hanged himself. On July 14, 58-year old Momohol Daminova died while weeding cotton fields under extreme heat in the Surkhandarya region. In October, four people died and 19 people were injured when an open-top cargo truck overturned while transporting them to farm No. 8 in the Mirzaobod district of Syrdarya region. In the Chust district of Namangan region, the two-year old son of a kindergarten teacher fell into a well and died while she picked cotton. The teacher could not afford to pay for an exemption to the field work or to hire someone to work in her place. On October 9, Dr. Yusuf Esirgapov died of a heart attack, following his release from detention. The hokim of Gallaorol district in Jizzak region Azim Tulaboev had arrested and detained Dr. Esirgetov, the chief doctor of the district’s central hospital, for not fulfilling the cotton harvest quota assigned to the hospital. On October 27, 27-year old Firuz Rofiev was killed when the car transporting him to the cotton fields of Kattakurgan district, Samarkand region, crashed into a tractor.
Working conditions presented health and safety risks to the citizens working in the cotton fields. During the cotton harvest, people picked cotton 10 hours per day, in some cases longer, and workers did not have weekends, holidays, or rest days off. Living conditions for citizens sent to the cotton harvest were crowded & unhygienic, typically school gymnasiums that provided insufficient access to washing facilities. Citizens mobilized to work in the cotton fields were not provided with protective gear such as gloves or face masks to protect against cotton plant thorns and fibers.

The forced mobilization undermined essential public services, including education and health care. From May until August, officials forcibly mobilized approximately 30% of public-sector workers, primarily teachers and health-care workers, to weed cotton fields for 10-15 day shifts. From September through October, administrators sent approximately 1/3 of the public-sector staff to pick cotton. Officials sent teachers for 10-day shifts, and medical staff for 20-day shifts. Officials closed some high schools and many universities during the cotton harvest. Health-care workers in the Samarkand region reported that one nurse was left to keep hospitals open while the rest of staff were sent to pick cotton. A nurse wrote,

“There is one nurse and one assistant left in the hospital when the rest of the staff is gone to the shift. They told us not to tell local authorities coming to the field that we are from a medical institution. They said that we had to tell them we came voluntarily, from the mahallas. If we do not do as they told us, they threatened to fire us or to reduce our shifts.”

Residents in Jizzak region reported delays in medical care. A diabetic woman reported that the health-care clinic in her district refused to provide her insulin for diabetes management until she threatened to report the lack of medications to Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty “Ozodlik.”

5. The ILO reaffirmed the existence of forced labor in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector

In 2015 the ILO conducted joint monitoring of forced and child labor with the Uzbek government. The ILO monitoring report reaffirms the existence of forced labor, stating that “the risk of forced labour under conditions of organized recruitment is real, and not merely theoretical”.

The ILO report includes findings that present serious concerns about the lack of implementation of the Uzbek government’s commitments against forced labor. These findings include: (1) the practices of officials responsible for meeting cotton quotas did not change; (2) there were indicators of forced labor related to widespread organized recruitment of adults to pick cotton; and (3) public-sector workers in the education and health-care sectors were compelled to
contribute labor or payments.\textsuperscript{32} The report notes the ILO received information from diverse sources that was “worrying,” “consistent enough to be accorded attention,” and that concluded “forced labour is more widespread than the monitoring process alone suggests.”\textsuperscript{33} The report concludes that “Robust further steps are required to remove the risk of forced labour.”\textsuperscript{34}


A. The government’s direct total control of the cotton sector sustains a system of patronage, is the root cause of forced labor and remained unaltered in 2015.

The government of Uzbekistan has not reformed policies that drive forced labor. The government’s direct total control of the cotton sector sustains a system of patronage, is the root cause of forced labor, and remained unaltered in 2015.

In the first quarter, the President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Agriculture and Water Resources, the Economy, Finance, Foreign Economic Relations, and Investments and Trade and representatives from Khlopkoprom\textsuperscript{35} set the national production target; the Prime Minister issued quotas to the regional hokims, and Khlopkoprom issued quotas to farmers via annual procurement contracts. From quota setting through the harvest, the regional hokims convened farmers to oversee progress towards the fulfillment of procurement quotas, with the support of district-level officials, the police, prosecutor general and occasionally the Prime Minister. The oversight system is known as “cotton collection headquarters,”\textsuperscript{36} and convenes by some estimates 200 meetings each year.\textsuperscript{37} Throughout 2015, regional governors were again held responsible for ensuring enough labour was available for cotton field work. They directed district and local authorities in their regions to implement labour recruitment plans.

The price was set by the Finance Ministry, and was below the government’s estimate of production costs, thereby making the mass use of forced labor the only way the cotton crop could be harvested.\textsuperscript{38} Under their lease contracts, farmers were, as in previous years, obligated to sell their cotton to one of the state-controlled gins. All cotton exports and domestic sales in Uzbekistan remained under centralized state control. In October, the government consolidated control over cotton procurement and sales with the establishment of the state-controlled enterprise Uzpahtasanoateksport. Once again, the income from cotton sales in 2015 disappeared into the extra-budgetary “Selkozfond (Agricultural Fund),” housed in the Ministry of Finance, to which only the highest level government officials have access and knowledge of its use.\textsuperscript{39}

B. In 2015, the Uzbek government took extraordinary measures to hide its use of forced labour.
The Uzbek government took extraordinary measures to cover up its use of coercion, demonstrating a lack of commitment to national labor laws, international labor conventions, and its related commitments to the ILO and World Bank.

Prior to the cotton harvest, officials required teachers and students to sign statements that they would participate in the harvest “voluntarily” and instructed teachers to tell foreigners that they pick cotton voluntarily. The presence of Uzbek government representatives with ILO monitors reduced the likelihood that any citizen would report coercion to the ILO. Citizens reported that they saw advertisements of a forced-labor complaint hotline but would never use it because they feared retaliation by officials.

Throughout the 2015 cotton production cycle police repeatedly arrested, attacked, and intimidated citizens documenting forced labor. Police arrested human rights defender Elena Urlaeva and subjected her to a body-cavity search on May 31. In August the prosecutor’s office threatened to press criminal charges against a human rights monitor in Karakalpakstan, under criminal code article 244, Establishment, Direction of or Participation in Religious Extremist, Separatist, Fundamentalist or Other Banned Organizations, which carries up to 20 years imprisonment. Police again arrested Ms. Urlaeva with her family in Kuyichirchik district, Tashkent region on September 19, and police arrested and beat Dmitry Tihonov in Angren city, Tashkent region on September 20. Police arrested Elena Urlaeva and Malohat Eshankulova on September 29 and ordered body-cavity searches of the two women during their 14-hours of detention. On October 20, police opened charges against Dmitry Tihonov, and the same day his home office was burned down, destroying his archive of evidence of forced labor, and additional materials stored were confiscated from a room in his house untouched by the fire. Continued intimidation by security services forced Mr. Tihonov to flee Uzbekistan by the end of 2015. On November 16, police arrested Uktam Pardaev, confiscated his files, computer and camera, and presented him with spurious charges that carry a penalty of up to five years in prison. Police kept Mr. Pardaev in pre-trial detention for two months, releasing him on January 11 under the condition that he no longer report human rights concerns.

These human rights monitors were engaged in exposing the Uzbek government’s violations of international covenants and national laws that prohibit forced labor. The government’s response violates its duty to protect the rights of freedom of expression and free exchange of information enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. With its reprisals, the Uzbek government also exposed the lack of sincerity in its commitments to ensure no forced labor occurs in World Bank project areas and to cooperate with the ILO to monitor those project areas and eradicate forced labor in the cotton sector.

The ILO monitoring report also conveys concerns about citizens’ fear of reporting violations. The report highlights that citizens did not speak candidly with monitors and did not have
confidence in the feedback mechanism, and that “reports that the authorities obstruct, detain and threaten people who are gathering information on labour standards during the harvest do not provide a conducive environment in which to assess and investigate labour practices.” The report adds that education and health-care officials presented monitors with apparently inaccurate attendance records.

V. Tier 3 Placement in the 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report is vital to ending forced labor in Uzbekistan.

In 2015, Uzbekistan did not meet the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and far from taking real steps to meet those standards, the Uzbek government continued to implement a state policy of systematic forced labor. On this basis, we call on the State Department to place Uzbekistan in Tier 3 in the 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report. Any other placement would reward the government of Uzbekistan in spite of its continued, flagrant disregard of its national laws and international commitments.

The Tier 3 placement would, on the other hand, communicate the need to end forced labor to the government of Uzbekistan. A decade of global pressure, including placing Uzbekistan at Tier 3 in the 2013 and 2014 TIP Reports, encouraged the Uzbek government to dramatically reduce its use of forced child labor. Following the upgrade to Tier 2 Watch List in the 2015 TIP Report, the Uzbek government fully implemented its forced-labor system. In response to new commitments stated by the Uzbek government at the conclusion of the 2015 cotton harvest, the ILO observed: “Implementation of those commitments on forced labour will have to be profound and extensive if behaviours and attitudes of the various authorities responsible for meeting cotton quotas are to change fundamentally.” The Uzbek government will shift from stated commitments to action to comply with the TVPA minimum standards and its commitments against forced labor when it faces consequences for inaction.

Endorsing organizations:

Advocates for Public Interest Law

American Apparel & Footwear Association

AFL-CIO

American Federation of Teachers
Anti-Slavery International

Association for Human Rights in Central Asia

Australian Council of Trade Unions

Bennett Freeman, Cotton Campaign Adviser

Brian Campbell, Cotton Campaign Legal Adviser

Center for Reflection, Education and Action

Child Labor Coalition

Dignity Health

Environmental Justice Foundation

The Eurasian Transition Group, e.V.

Freedom House

Inditex

International Labor Rights Forum

International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations

30 January 2016 www.cottoncampaign.org
Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union

National Consumers League

National Retail Federation

National Union of Workers

Northwest Coalition for Responsible Investment

No Slavery Australia

Open Society Foundations

Public Services International

Responsible Sourcing Network

Retail Council of Canada

Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia

Solidarity Center

Stop the Traffik

30 January 2016
Sunshine Coalition

Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, Uniting Church in Australia

Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia

U.S. Fashion Industry Association

Uzbek – German Forum for Human Rights

Walden Asset Management

Walk Free

Endnotes:

1 The evidence presented herein was gathered by human rights defenders in Uzbekistan through interviews, observations, and review of government documents. The human rights defenders have received training on monitoring and interview techniques by a social scientist and operate anonymously for their personal protection. Their reporting is frequently covered by independent news media outlets, such as those cited in this document. Much of the material herein is included in Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, *Chronicle of Forced Labour 2015*, [http://www.cottoncampaign.org/chronicle-of-forced-labor.html](http://www.cottoncampaign.org/chronicle-of-forced-labor.html) (last accessed 7 January 2015).

2 Uzpahtasanoateksport was established by Presidential decree on October to consolidate Uzpakhtasanoat (or Khlopkoprom), which previously managed farm leasing and gins and the three former foreign trade companies “Uzprommashimpex, Uzmarkazimpex and Uzinterimpex, which previously controlled exports and domestic sales. Decree available at: [http://www.norma.uz/raznoe/ukaz_prezidenta_respubliki_uzbekistan7](http://www.norma.uz/raznoe/ukaz_prezidenta_respubliki_uzbekistan7).


7 Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, monitor’s report, 8 November 2015.
11 Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, Jizzak region monitor, 6 October 2015.
15 Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, Chronicle of Forced Labour in Uzbekistan, Issue 3,


25 Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, Jizzak region monitor, 10 October 2015.


29 Ibid.

30 Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights monitor in Jizzak, October 2015.


33 ILO, *ibid* at ¶59 and ¶61.

34 ILO, *ibid* at ¶69.

35 Khlopkoprom (also known as Uzkhlopkoprom or Uzpakhtasanoat in Uzbek) is the state-controlled association responsible for procurement of raw cotton and ginning. Its regional divisions interact directly with farmers, including by obtaining farmers signatures on land leases and annual contracts for the delivery of cotton quotas.


37 Hornidge and Shtaltovna, *ibid*, page 23.


43 ILO, Ibid at ¶60

44 ILO, Ibid at ¶45 and ¶57.

45 ILO, Ibid at page 3.