



Comments Concerning the Ranking of Uzbekistan by the United States Department of State in the 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report, by the Cotton Campaign, January 2013

I. Introduction

The US Department of State exercised waiver provisions included in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) reauthorization in order not to downgrade Uzbekistan to Tier III in the *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report* (JTIP) despite the government of Uzbekistan's continued and systematic use of forced labor¹ for cotton production, repression of its citizens who attempt to monitor the situation, and direct denial of its egregious practices to the US government.² In 2013, the Department of State will no longer have waiver authority and must either downgrade Uzbekistan to Tier III or upgrade it to Tier II. Despite some changes in the demographics, during the 2012 harvest the Uzbek government mobilized hundreds of thousands of children and adults for forced labor in the fields, thereby clearly failing to demonstrate the sustained and significant progress required to justify an upgrade. Failure to rank Uzbekistan at Tier III in the 2013 Report would communicate to the government of Uzbekistan that state-sponsored forced labor is acceptable. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Department of State to rank Uzbekistan at Tier III, and to continue to use all its leverage to contribute to ending the egregious practice of forced labor in the cotton sector of Uzbekistan.

II. *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*

In the 2011 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, the US Department of Labor wrote,

*"In 2011, Uzbekistan made no advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. Although the Government created an Interagency Working Group to combat child labor, it failed to enforce legislation prohibiting the worst forms of child labor in the production of cotton. Authorities again closed schools and mobilized children to work in the annual autumn cotton harvest to meet Government-mandated harvest quotas."*³

¹ Forced labor is defined as "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily." International Labour Organization, C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).

² During the January 2012 hearing for US GSP, Ambassador Ilhom Nematov, Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan stated, "...already mentioned that today 100 percent of cotton is being produced by farms. It's not compulsory. I absolutely cannot agree with our friends that it's compulsory in Uzbekistan is forced labor. It's not forced labor because, you know, today literacy in Uzbekistan is 100 percent." and "Well, I don't know what you are talking about, but when we are talking about the quota system, we don't have quota system in Uzbekistan. I already said that during Soviet time, we had. During Soviet time, it was compulsory... And today we don't have any quota for this particular region, for the cotton... We don't have any quota, quota system." Reference: Executive Office of the President, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Public Hearing for U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): 2011 Annual Review of Country Practices." January 25, 2012, Washington D.C. Case No. 006-CP-08 WR – Uzbekistan.

³ Department of Labor, United States of America, *2011 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor*, "Part IV: Country Profiles – Uzbekistan," page 657.

In the 2012 *Trafficking in Persons Report* on Uzbekistan, the US Department of State wrote,

*“Domestic labor trafficking remains prevalent during the annual cotton harvest, when many school-age children as young as 10 years old, college students, and adults are victims of government-organized forced labor. There were reports that, during the cotton harvest, working conditions included long hours, insufficient food and water, exposure to harmful pesticides, verbal abuse and inadequate shelter. The use of forced mobilization of adult laborers and child laborers (over 15 years of age) during the cotton harvest was higher than in the previous years.”*⁴

The 2012 *Trafficking in Persons* report on Uzbekistan continued,

*“The Government of Uzbekistan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government has not shown evidence of increasing efforts to address human trafficking over the previous year; therefore, Uzbekistan is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a fifth consecutive year. Uzbekistan was granted a waiver of an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient resources to implement that plan. The Uzbek government continued to force children and adults to pick cotton. As in previous years, the government set a quota for national cotton production and paid farmers artificially low prices for the cotton produced, making it almost impossible for farmers to pay wages that would attract a voluntary workforce. Provincial mayors and governors were held personally responsible for ensuring that the quota was met; they in turn passed along this pressure to local officials, who organized and forced school children, university students, faculty, and other government employees to pick cotton. The government continued to refuse to allow the ILO to monitor the cotton harvest and denied that forced labor of children or adults in the cotton sector exists in Uzbekistan.”*⁵

*“Recommendations for Uzbekistan: Take substantive action to end the use of forced labor during the annual cotton harvest; investigate and prosecute government officials suspected to be complicit in trafficking, particularly those who forced children and adults to pick cotton during the annual harvest, and convict and punish complicit officials; allow international experts, such as the ILO, to conduct an independent assessment of the use of forced labor during the annual cotton harvest...”*⁶

In 2012, for the second consecutive year, the State Department exercised its authority to waive an automatic downgrade of Uzbekistan to Tier III for Trafficking in Persons (TIP), citing a written and funded plan of action from the government of Uzbekistan. Following both JTIP rankings, the Uzbek government continued to implement its forced labor cotton production system, consistently denied the existence of forced labor, and silenced citizen monitors. Neither the government of Uzbekistan nor the State Department made publicly available any written plan of action of the Uzbek government or evidence of its implementation. To the contrary, according to representatives of the US State Department, the mobilization of adults and children continued to be the prevalent practice in Uzbekistan, and the new inter-ministerial committee of the Uzbek government did not accomplish much. The government of Uzbekistan fully ignored the recommendations to take substantive action,

⁴ Department of State, United States of America, *Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2012* “Uzbekistan (Tier 2 Watch List),” page 367, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192598.pdf>, last accessed 21 January 2013.

⁵ Department of State, United States of America, *Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2012*, “Uzbekistan (Tier 2 Watch List),” page 368, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192598.pdf>, last accessed 21 January 2013.

⁶ *Ibid*, page 368

prosecute government officials complicit in forced labor of children and adults in the cotton sector, and to allow the International Labour Organization (ILO) to conduct an assessment.

Evidence from the fields year after year indicates that the government of Uzbekistan has not made significant efforts to end forced labor in the cotton sector and intends to continue the practice by communicating a myth of effort and improvement to the US government and all of its governmental and private-sector partners worldwide.

III. State-Sponsored Forced Labor in the 2012 Cotton Harvest

A. A Demographic Shift, but No Progress

Observers of the 2012 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan revealed that while there was no nationwide mobilization of younger children as in years past, there were a number of disturbing trends:

- continued large-scale, government-organized forced labor by older children and the closure of many secondary schools and higher education establishments for the duration of the harvest,
- intensified forced labor of adults,
- continued rejection of independent monitoring,
- harassment of Uzbek citizens who attempted to monitor the harvest, and
- increased extraction of financial and other resources from Uzbek citizens by government authorities.

The system of large-scale, government organized forced labor in the cotton harvest remained the same in 2012 as in previous years; implementation of the system was carried out with a demographic shift to older children and more adults and accompanied by an unprecedented scale of corruption. Even without nationwide mobilization of younger children, in some provinces younger children were still sent to the fields.

B. Reduction in the closure of primary schools, yet continuation of state-sponsored forced child labor

A significant factor that differentiated the 2012 cotton harvest from previous years was the reduction in state-sponsored forced labor of children under the age of 15. In July, Uzbekistan's Prime Minister issued verbal orders that schoolchildren were not to be sent to pick cotton, a statement that merely reiterated the existing national law that prohibits child labor. Similar statements were issued in previous years, but they were never fulfilled in practice. This year, the statement had an effect: for the first time in many years, the majority of schools for children under age 15 were not closed, and therefore young children were not forced en masse by government authorities to pick cotton. During the harvest, most elementary schools remained open. Unfortunately, sporadic forced labor of children under age 15 occurred, and the state-sponsored forced labor system was fully employed.

1. Forced labor of young children (ages 10-14)

In some regions of Uzbekistan, schoolchildren between the ages of 10 and 14 were sent to pick cotton for a few days, usually after school, but in some places during school hours. It is difficult to judge the scale of the use of forced labor of these younger children throughout the country because the government prevented almost all independent monitoring during the 2012 harvest. According to reliable information from the Uzbek-German Forum (UGF) network of civil-society observers of the harvest, at least three schools in the Kashkadaryo region

sent their schoolchildren out to pick cotton. In another district, in the Andijon region, at least two schools were shuttered for one month, from the end of September, to send children from the fifth grade and up with their teachers to the cotton fields. In Tashkent and Samarkand regions, schools sent children for a couple days at a time to the fields. Initial indications suggest that these instances of schools mobilizing schoolchildren during the 2012 harvest were the initiatives of local government authorities.

2. Forced labor of older children (ages 15-17)

The scale of coercive mobilization of high school students increased compared to previous harvests. These older children, typically ages 15-17, were forced en masse to pick cotton during the 2012 cotton harvest, thereby continuing nationwide forced child labor. Starting September 5, 2012, older children (ages 15-17) were sent to the cotton fields across the country, under threat of expulsion from school, and almost all of the nation's secondary schools were closed for the duration of the harvest.

While they were theoretically paid, the cost of their meals was deducted from their earnings. As a result, while students had to pick 60 kilograms per day, they only received payment for 25 kg. In practice, this meant that for a 10-12 hour work day, a half-starved 15-year old earned approximately 20 cents (USD).

These older children lived under appalling conditions. During the harvest they stayed in sport halls of local schools, in village cinemas, and in the meeting halls of administrative buildings. They slept on the floor, lacked adequate potable water, food and hygienic sanitation facilities. Sadly, there were also many incidents of students beaten by public authorities for failing to meet their quotas.

C. Intensified forced labor of adults

During the 2012 cotton harvest, the government shifted a significant share of the burden of the cotton harvest to citizens over the age of 18, by forcing greater numbers of university students, government employees – including teachers, doctors and nurses, private sector businessmen, transportation drivers, and low-income residents to contribute to the harvest, under threats to their livelihoods.

1. University students

Starting in early September, all university students were forced to work the 2012 cotton harvest, under threat of expulsion from school. As a university official commented to Radio Liberty, “If a student doesn’t go to pick cotton, she/he will be expelled from university.” University did not even open until the harvest was concluded, and conditions in the fields and accommodations were the same as the high school students’: unsafe, unsanitary, and undernourished. Groups of students fled the fields toward the end of their second month working 10-12 hour days in the fields and enduring startling physical abuse, and wandered home on their own.

“Should we let them loose instead of being strict with them? We only have one demand, to pick cotton and fulfill targets assigned by the mayor of the region, which is 60 kilo per day. We don’t ask for anything

else. We might have slapped one or two times when they misbehaved.” – Deputy Rector, Termiz State University, interviewed by Radio Liberty, September 2012⁷

“Yesterday our dean beat one of our friends. He beat him in his private parts... he couldn’t move. We had to return to Tashkent.” – Student, interviewed by Radio Liberty, October 2012⁸

2. Government employees

The government of Uzbekistan forced about one out of every six government employees to pick cotton in 2012, including teachers, doctors, nurses, members of the military, ministry offices and others. Among teachers, the percentage of those who were forced to work in the fields soared to 60%. The mass mobilization of government employees began as early as September 3rd. Each organization was obliged to delegate a certain number of staff members to pick cotton, and administrators scheduled shifts of their personnel to pick cotton for 2-3 weeks at a time. Upon one group’s return from the field, the administrator would send another until the organization met the quota of cotton assigned by the regional authorities.

Adults coercively mobilized from the cities were required to deliver 60-80 kilograms of cotton per day, depending on the region. The work routine was harsh, starting the day as early as 4:30 AM and working in the fields for 10-12 hours until late into the evening. If a cotton picker failed to deliver the quota expected, (s)he had to buy the remainder from local residents. If a cotton picker did not have the means to pay, the amount was deducted from his or her salary. Some of the larger public organizations collected money from staff that did not go out to the fields – due to severe illness or because they had young children – to pay for the missing kilograms, but cotton pickers from smaller organizations bore the full burden of paying any difference between the kilograms they picked and their assigned quotas.

Medical personnel, as government employees, were forced to pick cotton around the country in large numbers, thereby straining the delivery of essential medical care. Just accounting for the hospitals and clinics of Tashkent, 11,000 nurses and doctors were sent to work in fields far away, such as in Arnasay district of Jizzak region. The results were striking. During an interview with the Cotton Campaign in September, a resident of Bukhara reported, “My niece was ill, so I took her to the children’s hospital. They said that no doctors were available.”⁹ In another interview, a gynecologist from Bukhara reported that the same mobilization of medical personnel occurred in her region, and reports streamed in from throughout the country of the same coercive mobilization of medical personnel.

Delivery of education suffered tremendously as well. With an estimated 60% of all schoolteachers forced to work in the cotton fields, classes were combined to 50 and 60 students, and lessons were shortened or cancelled in the schools that were not closed. As for the lyceums and colleges (equivalent of high school) and universities, they

⁷ Ozodlik.org, “Термизлик проректор талабаларни калтакляпти,” Ozodlik.org, 17 September 2012, available at <http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/24710620.html>, last accessed 20 December 2012.

⁸ Варно Анвар, “Қочоқ талаба: Норма 5 кило, далада эса пахта деяри йўқ,” Ozodlik.org, 15 October 2012, available at <http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/24739714.html>, last accessed 21 October 2012.

⁹ Resident of Bukhara 3, anonymous for personal security. Personal Interview by Matthew Fischer-Daly. 26 September 2012.

were all closed, with nearly no exceptions, until the end of the harvest. As of November, most older students throughout the country had not spent a single day studying during the new academic year.

3. Private Sector: Domestic and Multinational Companies

In 2012, the government of Uzbekistan did not refrain from coercively mobilizing the private sector to contribute to the cotton harvest. As early as July, local government authorities ordered private businesses to support the cotton harvest with labor, financial or in-kind contributions. While described by officials as a voluntary appeal, it was accompanied by threats of tax fines for any businesses that failed to contribute adequately. The practice was most widely reported in Angren district of Tashkent region.

Workers at the General Motors Uzbekistan plant in Asaka, Andijon region were forced to pick cotton for the Uzbek government, reportedly for the second year in a row. According to a GM worker interviewed by human rights activists in 2012, GM workers were sent to pick cotton between September 20 and October 22, primarily in the Andijon and Syrdarya regions. Company managers oversaw the workers in the fields who worked just like the others in the fields, 10-12 hours every day. The auto workers did not refuse to go or ask about being paid, because they valued keeping their jobs.

“There were no such cases that someone refused to go... Because the work that they assigned us had to be done. Do you think that it is easy to get a job at this company? If you lose this kind of job – you will not likely find another one.” GM Uzbekistan worker, October 2012¹⁰

4. Lower-income citizens

As in previous years, mahalla committees (community-based organizations) also contributed adults to the cotton harvest. Although often described as voluntary labor, their participation is also forced with threats to their livelihoods. The mahalla committees are responsible for distributing government welfare benefits to low-income citizens. Sadly, this means that many mahallas committees denied social welfare benefits to the low-income citizens who refused to pick cotton. The mahalla committee members who participate are typically low-income citizens seeking additional income, and nearly all women, because many of the men in rural areas have migrated to Russia or elsewhere in search of employment.

In the Jizzakh region, mahalla committees were denying child-care benefits to mothers who refused to pick cotton as early as mid-September, reported the local human rights activist Uktam Pardaev. On September 30, Mr. Pardaev was arrested and detained. Another resident of Jizzak region reported that local authorities cut off electricity for the homes of women who refused to pick cotton.

“The mahalla committee, the local police, the representatives from the women’s committee and an electrician all came to cut off power. They did it in retaliation for the women’s refusal to go to the cotton fields. They

¹⁰ Worker of GM in Uzbekistan, name anonymous to protect personal security. Personal Interview by Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights. 25 November 2012. Andijon.

send everyone receiving welfare benefits to pick cotton. When they refuse to go, they all come and cut off the power.” – Jasurbek, resident of Pakhtakor district, Jizzak region¹¹

D. Increase in deaths in the cotton fields

Every year, Uzbek civil society activists report deaths in the cotton fields, but in 2012, they reported seven deaths, the highest number in any single year. Of these, five were college students. Some of the tragedies in 2012 included: Aziz Bakhtiyorov, 18 years old and a second-year student in Djizzakh city Art College, died of a heart attack in the cotton field on September 30;¹² Navruz Muyzinov, 18 years old, was reportedly beaten to death by police officers when he walked off the cotton field in Shahrisabz district on October 6;¹³ Umid, a third-year student at Bukhara High Technology and Engineering University, was run over by a tractor as he left the cotton field in the evening darkness on 22 October; Igor Yachkevskiy, 55 years old and resident of Tashkent city, died of a heart attack while picking cotton in Okkurgon district, Tashkent region on September 17.¹⁴

E. Increased corruption

Remarkably, the 2012 cotton crop was harvested much more quickly than in previous years, and apparently at a lower financial cost to the government. The material costs associated with manual cotton collection were passed on to the country’s citizens. The scale of extortion from state employees, private businesses and students was unprecedented in its scope and scale during the 2012 cotton harvest.

Students were informed that if they did not go to the cotton fields, they would have to pay \$200 or face expulsion. Unprecedented numbers of adults sent to pick cotton did not receive any payment for the cotton they picked. Initial indications highlighted that the majority of government employees received no compensation for their work. Any adults who wanted an exemption from picking cotton and had the economic means could pay roughly \$200, an amount that corresponds to more than the average monthly salary in Uzbekistan. The money was supposedly used to hire markidors (day laborers) to work in their place; however, no one knows where this money really went, because there were no transparent accounting systems.

Extortion from businessmen increased in scale and formality. As a businessman from Angren reported to Radio Liberty, “Taxmen told us last year that we should either pick cotton ourselves or donate 50,000 soms. We gave money without receipts and we do not know how the money was spent.”¹⁵ According to the report, another Angren businessman reported that the levy was 4-6 times higher in 2012 than in the past, and a bank account was established into which the businessmen had to make deposits.

¹¹ Mexribon, “Жиззахда пахтага чиқмаган болали аёллар жазоланмоқда” Ozodlik.org, 24 September 2012, available at <http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/24718319.html>, last accessed 20 December 2012.

¹² Sadridin Ashour, “Жиззахлик талаба пахта даласида ўлди,” Ozodlik.org, 5 October 2012, available at <http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/24730268.html>, last accessed 21 December 2012.

¹³ Barno Anwar, “Шахрисабзлик марҳум теримчининг оиласи адолат кутмоқда,” Ozodlik.org, 15 October 2012, available at <http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/24740357.html#hash=relatedInfoContainer>, last accessed 21 October 2012.

¹⁴ Abdullah Iskandar, “Мен пахта сиёсатига қаршиман!,” Ozodlik.org, 19 October 2011, available at <http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/24364810.html>, last accessed 2 January 2013.

¹⁵ UzNews, “Businesses forced to sponsor cotton harvesting in Angren,” 12 September 2012, available at http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&sub=hot&cid=2&nid=20776, last accessed 21 January 2013.

F. No Independent Monitoring

Once again, the government of Uzbekistan failed to invite the International Labour Organization (ILO) to conduct monitoring during the 2012 cotton harvest. Since 2009 the ILO has called on the Uzbek government to respond to continued reports from workers, employers, and civil society of systematic and persistent use of forced labor of children and adults in Uzbekistan's cotton fields. Since 2010 the ILO tripartite supervisory body has called on the GOU to invite a high-level tripartite mission to conduct unfettered monitoring during the cotton harvest. In 2012, the ILO offered the Uzbek government an opportunity to take an initial step by inviting an ILO technical assistance team that would monitor during the harvest. The GOU, however, has steadfastly refused to grant access to the ILO.

Throughout the 2012 cotton harvest, the government of Uzbekistan continued to harass, intimidate and repress citizens who attempted to monitor the 2012 cotton harvest. The government carefully avoided documentation of the coercive mobilization of adults and children. Students were forbidden from using their phones to photograph the accommodations where they stayed, and farms were under surveillance by police. Gulshan Karaeva of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) was arrested on opaque charges of "slander" on September 27, ensuring that she would not be able to report on the cotton harvest as she had done in previous years. Uktam Pardaev of the Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan was arrested on September 30. On October 20, members of the Human Rights Alliance of Uzbekistan (HRAU) were forced into hiding by local police after they photographed young children picking cotton in the Kashkadarya Region.

No international company invested in Uzbekistan has yet to conduct human rights due diligence despite the high risk of complicity in the system of forced labor of children and adults in the cotton sector. While called for by the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and UN Principles on Business and Human Rights, the responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence would begin with independent risk assessments and civil-society led monitoring. In its September 2012 decision on the OECD petition concerning the French cotton trading company Devcot S.A., the OECD National Contact Point (NCP) of France stated,

*"The NCP recalls that, in any circumstance, child labor and forced labor in Uzbekistan's cotton fields constitute a flagrant and characterized violation of the OECD Guidelines. Generally, the NCP further recalls that the trade of products issued from forced child labor, wherever it takes place, constitutes a flagrant and characterized violation of the OECD Guidelines." "The situation in terms of forced labor and child labor remains clearly critical in Uzbekistan."*¹⁶

G. Lessons Learned from the 2012 Cotton Harvest

The government of Uzbekistan did not make the legally required substantial and sustained progress toward ending forced labor of children and adults during the 2012 cotton harvest. While most elementary schools remained open and younger children were not mobilized on the same massive scale as in the past, government-organized forced child labor of high-school students increased nationwide; there were incidents of forced child labor of young

¹⁶ "Devcot: Communiqué du Point de contact national français chargé du suivi des principes directeurs de l'OCDE à l'intention des entreprises multinationales," 21 September 2012, available at <http://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/File/375194>, last accessed 21 January 2013.

children, apparently organized by local government officials; and government-organized forced labor of adults intensified dramatically. Furthermore, the increased financial extortion during the 2012 harvest is alarming.

One clear lesson is that the government of Uzbekistan was at some level responsive to ongoing international calls to end forced labor in the cotton sector. Unfortunately, the message that state-sponsored forced labor of any kind, any age child or adult, is illegal under national law and violates international standards seems not to have reached the Uzbek government. With the continuation of state-sponsored forced labor during the 2012 cotton harvest, it is increasingly incumbent on governments and companies as well investors to use their diplomatic and economic leverage to build political will in the government of Uzbekistan to end the forced labor system.

IV. 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report Ranking

In 2013, the State Department no longer has the authority to waive downgrading Uzbekistan to Tier III status. Currently, Uzbekistan does not meet the standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for inclusion in the Tier II category. On June 19, 2012, the Cotton Campaign and nearly 40 business, labor, human rights and investor organizations worldwide wrote a letter to the Secretary of State. The letter identified that the minimum step the government of Uzbekistan should have taken to avoid a downgrade in the 2013 JTIP report was to invite the ILO to monitor the 2012 cotton harvest.¹⁷ The government of Uzbekistan demonstrated its disregard for its human rights commitments and the US TVPRA minimum standards by refusing once again to invite the ILO.

We call on the State Department to downgrade Uzbekistan to Tier III in the *2013 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Failure to downgrade Uzbekistan to Tier III would reward the government of Uzbekistan for flagrant disregard of its national laws and international commitments and ensure state-sponsored forced labor of over one million children and adults in the Uzbek cotton sector in 2013.

Endorsing Organizations:

Advocates for Public Interest Law



American Apparel and Footwear Association



American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations



American Federation of Teachers

¹⁷ Available at <http://www.cottoncampaign.org/2012/06/20/uzbekistan-us-report-fails-child-labor-victims-unwillingness-to-impose-meaningful-consequences-allows-abuses-to-continue/>.

Anti-Slavery International



Boston Common Asset Management



Calvert Investments



Catholic Health East



Child Labor Coalition



Cotton Campaign



Environmental Justice Foundation



European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights



Freedom House



Inkota netzwerk e.V.



International Crisis Group



International Labor Rights Forum



**Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate
Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Office**



National Consumers League



National Retail Federation



Open Society Foundations



Responsible Sourcing Network



Sisters of St. Joseph of Springfield Massachusetts



Stop the Traffik



Uniting Church in Australia Synod of Victoria and Tasmania



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